wmi-1.3.16 from opsview.com

This commit is contained in:
Are Casilla
2019-02-16 00:16:52 +01:00
parent 163fdd3d1b
commit 17b3af2911
2146 changed files with 678824 additions and 0 deletions
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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
simple kerberos5 routines for active directory
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2002-2003
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/network.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "system/time.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_SET_DEFAULT_IN_TKT_ETYPES) && !defined(HAVE_KRB5_SET_DEFAULT_TGS_KTYPES)
krb5_error_code krb5_set_default_tgs_ktypes(krb5_context ctx, const krb5_enctype *enc)
{
return krb5_set_default_in_tkt_etypes(ctx, enc);
}
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_ADDR_TYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS)
/* HEIMDAL */
void setup_kaddr( krb5_address *pkaddr, struct sockaddr *paddr)
{
pkaddr->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET;
pkaddr->address.length = sizeof(((struct sockaddr_in *)paddr)->sin_addr);
pkaddr->address.data = (char *)&(((struct sockaddr_in *)paddr)->sin_addr);
}
#elif defined(HAVE_ADDRTYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS)
/* MIT */
void setup_kaddr( krb5_address *pkaddr, struct sockaddr *paddr)
{
pkaddr->addrtype = ADDRTYPE_INET;
pkaddr->length = sizeof(((struct sockaddr_in *)paddr)->sin_addr);
pkaddr->contents = (krb5_octet *)&(((struct sockaddr_in *)paddr)->sin_addr);
}
#else
#error UNKNOWN_ADDRTYPE
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL2SALT) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_USE_ENCTYPE) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_STRING_TO_KEY) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_ENCRYPT_BLOCK)
int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
krb5_data *password,
krb5_keyblock *key,
krb5_enctype enctype)
{
int ret;
krb5_data salt;
krb5_encrypt_block eblock;
ret = krb5_principal2salt(context, host_princ, &salt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("krb5_principal2salt failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
return ret;
}
krb5_use_enctype(context, &eblock, enctype);
ret = krb5_string_to_key(context, &eblock, key, password, &salt);
SAFE_FREE(salt.data);
return ret;
}
#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_PW_SALT) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_STRING_TO_KEY_SALT)
int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
krb5_data *password,
krb5_keyblock *key,
krb5_enctype enctype)
{
int ret;
krb5_salt salt;
ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, host_princ, &salt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("krb5_get_pw_salt failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_string_to_key_salt(context, enctype, password->data,
salt, key);
krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
return ret;
}
#else
#error UNKNOWN_CREATE_KEY_FUNCTIONS
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_PERMITTED_ENCTYPES)
krb5_error_code get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(krb5_context context,
krb5_enctype **enctypes)
{
return krb5_get_permitted_enctypes(context, enctypes);
}
#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_DEFAULT_IN_TKT_ETYPES)
krb5_error_code get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(krb5_context context,
krb5_enctype **enctypes)
{
return krb5_get_default_in_tkt_etypes(context, enctypes);
}
#else
#error UNKNOWN_GET_ENCTYPES_FUNCTIONS
#endif
void free_kerberos_etypes(krb5_context context,
krb5_enctype *enctypes)
{
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_FREE_KTYPES)
krb5_free_ktypes(context, enctypes);
return;
#else
SAFE_FREE(enctypes);
return;
#endif
}
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_AUTH_CON_SETKEY) && !defined(HAVE_KRB5_AUTH_CON_SETUSERUSERKEY)
krb5_error_code krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context auth_context,
krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
{
return krb5_auth_con_setkey(context, auth_context, keyblock);
}
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_KRB5_FREE_UNPARSED_NAME)
void krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb5_context context, char *val)
{
SAFE_FREE(val);
}
#endif
void kerberos_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *pdata)
{
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_FREE_DATA_CONTENTS)
if (pdata->data) {
krb5_free_data_contents(context, pdata);
}
#else
SAFE_FREE(pdata->data);
#endif
}
void kerberos_set_creds_enctype(krb5_creds *pcreds, int enctype)
{
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_IN_CREDS)
KRB5_KEY_TYPE((&pcreds->keyblock)) = enctype;
#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_SESSION_IN_CREDS)
KRB5_KEY_TYPE((&pcreds->session)) = enctype;
#else
#error UNKNOWN_KEYBLOCK_MEMBER_IN_KRB5_CREDS_STRUCT
#endif
}
BOOL kerberos_compatible_enctypes(krb5_context context,
krb5_enctype enctype1,
krb5_enctype enctype2)
{
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_C_ENCTYPE_COMPARE)
krb5_boolean similar = 0;
krb5_c_enctype_compare(context, enctype1, enctype2, &similar);
return similar ? True : False;
#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_ENCTYPES_COMPATIBLE_KEYS)
return krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys(context, enctype1, enctype2) ? True : False;
#endif
}
krb5_error_code smb_krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab_entry *kt_entry)
{
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_KT_FREE_ENTRY)
return krb5_kt_free_entry(context, kt_entry);
#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_FREE_KEYTAB_ENTRY_CONTENTS)
return krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents(context, kt_entry);
#else
#error UNKNOWN_KT_FREE_FUNCTION
#endif
}
char *smb_get_krb5_error_message(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
{
char *ret;
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_STRING) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_STRING)
char *context_error = krb5_get_error_string(context);
if (context_error) {
ret = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s: %s", error_message(code), context_error);
krb5_free_error_string(context, context_error);
return ret;
}
#endif
ret = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, error_message(code));
return ret;
}
#endif
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# NOTE! this whole m4 file is disabled in configure.in for now
#################################################
# KRB5 support
KRB5_CFLAGS=""
KRB5_CPPFLAGS=""
KRB5_LDFLAGS=""
KRB5_LIBS=""
with_krb5_support=auto
krb5_withval=auto
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for KRB5 support])
# Do no harm to the values of CFLAGS and LIBS while testing for
# Kerberos support.
AC_ARG_WITH(krb5,
[ --with-krb5=base-dir Locate Kerberos 5 support (default=auto)],
[ case "$withval" in
no)
with_krb5_support=no
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
krb5_withval=no
;;
yes)
with_krb5_support=yes
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
krb5_withval=yes
;;
auto)
with_krb5_support=auto
AC_MSG_RESULT(auto)
krb5_withval=auto
;;
*)
with_krb5_support=yes
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
krb5_withval=$withval
KRB5CONFIG="$krb5_withval/bin/krb5-config"
;;
esac ],
AC_MSG_RESULT($with_krb5_support)
)
if test x$with_krb5_support != x"no"; then
FOUND_KRB5=no
FOUND_KRB5_VIA_CONFIG=no
#################################################
# check for krb5-config from recent MIT and Heimdal kerberos 5
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for working specified location for krb5-config)
if test x$KRB5CONFIG != "x"; then
if test -x "$KRB5CONFIG"; then
ac_save_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
CFLAGS="";export CFLAGS
ac_save_LDFLAGS=$LDFLAGS
LDFLAGS="";export LDFLAGS
KRB5_LIBS="`$KRB5CONFIG --libs gssapi`"
KRB5_CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONFIG --cflags | sed s/@INCLUDE_des@//`"
KRB5_CPPFLAGS="`$KRB5CONFIG --cflags | sed s/@INCLUDE_des@//`"
CFLAGS=$ac_save_CFLAGS;export CFLAGS
LDFLAGS=$ac_save_LDFLAGS;export LDFLAGS
FOUND_KRB5=yes
FOUND_KRB5_VIA_CONFIG=yes
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes. Found $KRB5CONFIG)
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no. Fallback to specified directory)
fi
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no. Fallback to finding krb5-config in path)
#################################################
# check for krb5-config from recent MIT and Heimdal kerberos 5
AC_PATH_PROG(KRB5CONFIG, krb5-config)
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for working krb5-config in path)
if test -x "$KRB5CONFIG"; then
ac_save_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
CFLAGS="";export CFLAGS
ac_save_LDFLAGS=$LDFLAGS
LDFLAGS="";export LDFLAGS
KRB5_LIBS="`$KRB5CONFIG --libs gssapi`"
KRB5_CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONFIG --cflags | sed s/@INCLUDE_des@//`"
KRB5_CPPFLAGS="`$KRB5CONFIG --cflags | sed s/@INCLUDE_des@//`"
CFLAGS=$ac_save_CFLAGS;export CFLAGS
LDFLAGS=$ac_save_LDFLAGS;export LDFLAGS
FOUND_KRB5=yes
FOUND_KRB5_VIA_CONFIG=yes
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes. Found $KRB5CONFIG)
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no. Fallback to previous krb5 detection strategy)
fi
fi
if test x$FOUND_KRB5 != x"yes"; then
#################################################
# check for location of Kerberos 5 install
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for kerberos 5 install path)
case "$krb5_withval" in
no)
AC_MSG_RESULT(no krb5-path given)
;;
yes)
AC_MSG_RESULT(/usr)
FOUND_KRB5=yes
;;
*)
AC_MSG_RESULT($krb5_withval)
KRB5_CFLAGS="-I$krb5_withval/include"
KRB5_CPPFLAGS="-I$krb5_withval/include"
KRB5_LDFLAGS="-L$krb5_withval/lib"
FOUND_KRB5=yes
;;
esac
fi
if test x$FOUND_KRB5 != x"yes"; then
#################################################
# see if this box has the SuSE location for the heimdal krb implementation
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for /usr/include/heimdal)
if test -d /usr/include/heimdal; then
if test -f /usr/lib/heimdal/lib/libkrb5.a; then
KRB5_CFLAGS="-I/usr/include/heimdal"
KRB5_CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/include/heimdal"
KRB5_LDFLAGS="-L/usr/lib/heimdal/lib"
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
else
KRB5_CFLAGS="-I/usr/include/heimdal"
KRB5_CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/include/heimdal"
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
fi
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
fi
if test x$FOUND_KRB5 != x"yes"; then
#################################################
# see if this box has the RedHat location for kerberos
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for /usr/kerberos)
if test -d /usr/kerberos -a -f /usr/kerberos/lib/libkrb5.a; then
KRB5_LDFLAGS="-L/usr/kerberos/lib"
KRB5_CFLAGS="-I/usr/kerberos/include"
KRB5_CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/kerberos/include"
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
fi
ac_save_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
ac_save_CPPFLAGS=$CPPFLAGS
ac_save_LDFLAGS=$LDFLAGS
#MIT needs this, to let us see 'internal' parts of the headers we use
KRB5_CFLAGS="${KRB5_CFLAGS} -DKRB5_PRIVATE -DKRB5_DEPRECATED"
#Heimdal needs this
#TODO: we need to parse KRB5_LIBS for -L path
# and set -Wl,-rpath -Wl,path
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $KRB5_CFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $KRB5_CPPFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $KRB5_LDFLAGS"
KRB5_LIBS="$KRB5_LDFLAGS $KRB5_LIBS"
# now check for krb5.h. Some systems have the libraries without the headers!
# note that this check is done here to allow for different kerberos
# include paths
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(krb5.h)
if test x"$ac_cv_header_krb5_h" = x"no"; then
# Give a warning if KRB5 support was not explicitly requested,
# i.e with_krb5_support = auto, otherwise die with an error.
if test x"$with_krb5_support" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([KRB5 cannot be supported without krb5.h])
else
AC_MSG_WARN([KRB5 cannot be supported without krb5.h])
fi
# Turn off AD support and restore CFLAGS and LIBS variables
with_krb5_support="no"
fi
CFLAGS=$ac_save_CFLAGS
CPPFLAGS=$ac_save_CPPFLAGS
LDFLAGS=$ac_save_LDFLAGS
fi
# Now we have determined whether we really want KRB5 support
if test x"$with_krb5_support" != x"no"; then
ac_save_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
ac_save_CPPFLAGS=$CPPFLAGS
ac_save_LDFLAGS=$LDFLAGS
ac_save_LIBS=$LIBS
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $KRB5_CFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $KRB5_CPPFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $KRB5_LDFLAGS"
# now check for gssapi headers. This is also done here to allow for
# different kerberos include paths
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(gssapi.h gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h com_err.h)
# Heimdal checks.
# But only if we didn't have a krb5-config to tell us this already
if test x"$FOUND_KRB5_VIA_CONFIG" != x"yes"; then
##################################################################
# we might need the k5crypto and com_err libraries on some systems
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(com_err, KRB5_LIBS, _et_list)
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(k5crypto, KRB5_LIBS, krb5_encrypt_data)
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(crypto, KRB5_LIBS, des_set_key)
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(asn1, KRB5_LIBS, copy_Authenticator)
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(roken, KRB5_LIBS, roken_getaddrinfo_hostspec)
fi
# Heimdal checks. On static Heimdal gssapi must be linked before krb5.
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(gssapi, KRB5_LIBS, gss_display_status,[],[],
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GSSAPI,1,[Whether GSSAPI is available]))
########################################################
# now see if we can find the krb5 libs in standard paths
# or as specified above
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(krb5, KRB5_LIBS, krb5_mk_req_extended)
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(krb5, KRB5_LIBS, krb5_kt_compare)
########################################################
# now see if we can find the gssapi libs in standard paths
if test x"$ac_cv_lib_ext_gssapi_gss_display_status" != x"yes"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(gssapi_krb5, KRB5_LIBS,gss_display_status,[],[],
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GSSAPI,1,[Whether GSSAPI is available]))
fi
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_set_real_time, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_set_default_in_tkt_etypes, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_set_default_tgs_ktypes, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_principal2salt, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_use_enctype, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_string_to_key, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_get_pw_salt, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_string_to_key_salt, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_auth_con_setkey, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_locate_kdc, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_get_permitted_enctypes, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_get_default_in_tkt_etypes, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_free_ktypes, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_free_data_contents, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_principal_get_comp_string, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_free_unparsed_name, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_kt_free_entry, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_verify_checksum, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_c_verify_checksum, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_ticket_get_authorization_data_type, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_c_enctype_compare, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_get_error_string, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_free_error_string, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_initlog, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_addlog_func, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(krb5_set_warn_dest, $KRB5_LIBS)
LIBS="$LIBS $KRB5_LIBS"
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for krb5_log_facility type],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_LOG_FACILITY,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_log_facility block;],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_LOG_FACILITY=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_LOG_FACILITY=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_LOG_FACILITY" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KRB5_LOG_FACILITY,1,
[Whether the type krb5_log_facility exists])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for krb5_encrypt_block type],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_ENCRYPT_BLOCK,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_encrypt_block block;],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_ENCRYPT_BLOCK=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_ENCRYPT_BLOCK=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_ENCRYPT_BLOCK" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KRB5_ENCRYPT_BLOCK,1,
[Whether the type krb5_encrypt_block exists])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for addrtype in krb5_address],
samba_cv_HAVE_ADDRTYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_address kaddr; kaddr.addrtype = ADDRTYPE_INET;],
samba_cv_HAVE_ADDRTYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_ADDRTYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_ADDRTYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ADDRTYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS,1,
[Whether the krb5_address struct has a addrtype property])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for addr_type in krb5_address],
samba_cv_HAVE_ADDR_TYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_address kaddr; kaddr.addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET;],
samba_cv_HAVE_ADDR_TYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_ADDR_TYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_ADDR_TYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ADDR_TYPE_IN_KRB5_ADDRESS,1,
[Whether the krb5_address struct has a addr_type property])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for enc_part2 in krb5_ticket],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_TKT_ENC_PART2,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_ticket tkt; tkt.enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->contents = NULL;],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_TKT_ENC_PART2=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_TKT_ENC_PART2=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_TKT_ENC_PART2" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KRB5_TKT_ENC_PART2,1,
[Whether the krb5_ticket struct has a enc_part2 property])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for keyblock in krb5_creds],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_IN_CREDS,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_creds creds; krb5_keyblock kb; creds.keyblock = kb;],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_IN_CREDS=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_IN_CREDS=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_IN_CREDS" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_IN_CREDS,1,
[Whether the krb5_creds struct has a keyblock property])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for session in krb5_creds],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_SESSION_IN_CREDS,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_creds creds; krb5_keyblock kb; creds.session = kb;],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_SESSION_IN_CREDS=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_SESSION_IN_CREDS=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_SESSION_IN_CREDS" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KRB5_SESSION_IN_CREDS,1,
[Whether the krb5_creds struct has a session property])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for keyvalue in krb5_keyblock],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_KEYVALUE,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_keyblock key; key.keyvalue.data = NULL;],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_KEYVALUE=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_KEYVALUE=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_KEYVALUE" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_KEYVALUE,1,
[Whether the krb5_keyblock struct has a keyvalue property])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5],
samba_cv_HAVE_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_enctype enctype; enctype = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5;],
samba_cv_HAVE_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5=no)])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56],
samba_cv_HAVE_KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_keytype keytype; keytype = KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56;],
samba_cv_HAVE_KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56=no)])
# Heimdals with KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR but not KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56 are broken
# w.r.t. arcfour and windows, so we must not enable it here
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5" = x"yes" -a\
x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,1,
[Whether the ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5 key type is available])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY],
samba_cv_HAVE_AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_flags ap_options; ap_options = AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY;],
samba_cv_HAVE_AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY,1,
[Whether the AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY ap option is available])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for KV5M_KEYTAB],
samba_cv_HAVE_KV5M_KEYTAB,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_keytab_entry entry; entry.magic = KV5M_KEYTAB;],
samba_cv_HAVE_KV5M_KEYTAB=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KV5M_KEYTAB=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KV5M_KEYTAB" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KV5M_KEYTAB,1,
[Whether the KV5M_KEYTAB option is available])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for the krb5_princ_component macro],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_PRINC_COMPONENT,[
AC_TRY_LINK([#include <krb5.h>],
[const krb5_data *pkdata; krb5_context context; krb5_principal principal;
pkdata = krb5_princ_component(context, principal, 0);],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_PRINC_COMPONENT=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_PRINC_COMPONENT=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_PRINC_COMPONENT" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KRB5_PRINC_COMPONENT,1,
[Whether krb5_princ_component is available])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for key in krb5_keytab_entry],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYTAB_ENTRY_KEY,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_keytab_entry entry; krb5_keyblock e; entry.key = e;],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYTAB_ENTRY_KEY=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYTAB_ENTRY_KEY=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYTAB_ENTRY_KEY" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KRB5_KEYTAB_ENTRY_KEY,1,
[Whether krb5_keytab_entry has key member])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for keyblock in krb5_keytab_entry],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYTAB_ENTRY_KEYBLOCK,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_keytab_entry entry; entry.keyblock.keytype = 0;],
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYTAB_ENTRY_KEYBLOCK=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYTAB_ENTRY_KEYBLOCK=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_KRB5_KEYTAB_ENTRY_KEYBLOCK" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KRB5_KEYTAB_ENTRY_KEYBLOCK,1,
[Whether krb5_keytab_entry has keyblock member])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for WRFILE: keytab support],
samba_cv_HAVE_WRFILE_KEYTAB,[
AC_TRY_RUN([
#include<krb5.h>
main()
{
krb5_context context;
krb5_keytab keytab;
krb5_init_context(&context);
return krb5_kt_resolve(context, "WRFILE:api", &keytab);
}],
samba_cv_HAVE_WRFILE_KEYTAB=yes,
samba_cv_HAVE_WRFILE_KEYTAB=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_HAVE_WRFILE_KEYTAB" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_WRFILE_KEYTAB,1,
[Whether the WRFILE:-keytab is supported])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for krb5_princ_realm returns krb5_realm or krb5_data],
samba_cv_KRB5_PRINC_REALM_RETURNS_REALM,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <krb5.h>],
[krb5_context context;krb5_principal principal;krb5_realm realm;
realm = *krb5_princ_realm(context, principal);],
samba_cv_KRB5_PRINC_REALM_RETURNS_REALM=yes,
samba_cv_KRB5_PRINC_REALM_RETURNS_REALM=no)])
if test x"$samba_cv_KRB5_PRINC_REALM_RETURNS_REALM" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(KRB5_PRINC_REALM_RETURNS_REALM,1,
[Whether krb5_princ_realm returns krb5_realm or krb5_data])
fi
# TODO: check all gssapi headers for this
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for GSS_C_DCE_STYLE in gssapi.h],
samba_cv_GSS_C_DCE_STYLE,[
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <gssapi.h>],
[int flags = GSS_C_DCE_STYLE;],
samba_cv_GSS_C_DCE_STYLE=yes,
samba_cv_GSS_C_DCE_STYLE=no)])
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(gsskrb5_get_initiator_subkey, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(gsskrb5_extract_authz_data_from_sec_context, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity, $KRB5_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_FUNC_EXT(gss_krb5_ccache_name, $KRB5_LIBS)
if test x"$ac_cv_lib_ext_krb5_krb5_mk_req_extended" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_KRB5,1,[Whether to have KRB5 support])
AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether KRB5 support is used)
SMB_ENABLE(KRB5,YES)
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
echo "KRB5_CFLAGS: ${KRB5_CFLAGS}"
echo "KRB5_CPPFLAGS: ${KRB5_CPPFLAGS}"
echo "KRB5_LDFLAGS: ${KRB5_LDFLAGS}"
echo "KRB5_LIBS: ${KRB5_LIBS}"
else
if test x"$with_krb5_support" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR(a working krb5 library is needed for KRB5 support)
else
AC_MSG_WARN(a working krb5 library is needed for KRB5 support)
fi
KRB5_CFLAGS=""
KRB5_CPPFLAGS=""
KRB5_LDFLAGS=""
KRB5_LIBS=""
with_krb5_support=no
fi
# checks if we have access to a libkdc
# and can use it for our builtin kdc server_service
KDC_CFLAGS=""
KDC_CPPFLAGS=""
KDC_DLFLAGS=""
KDC_LIBS=""
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(kdc.h)
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(kdc, KDC_LIBS, krb5_kdc_default_config)
AC_CHECK_LIB_EXT(hdb, KDC_LIBS, hdb_generate_key_set_password)
AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether libkdc is used)
if test x"$ac_cv_header_kdc_h" = x"yes"; then
if test x"$ac_cv_lib_ext_kdc_krb5_kdc_default_config" = x"yes"; then
if test x"$ac_cv_lib_ext_hdb_hdb_generate_key_set_password" = x"yes"; then
SMB_ENABLE(KDC,YES)
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
echo "KDC_LIBS: ${KDC_LIBS}"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
CFLAGS=$ac_save_CFLAGS
CPPFLAGS=$ac_save_CPPFLAGS
LDFLAGS=$ac_save_LDFLAGS
LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS"
# as a nasty hack add the krb5 stuff to the global vars,
# at some point this should not be needed anymore when the build system
# can handle that alone
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $KRB5_CFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $KRB5_CPPFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $KRB5_LDFLAGS"
fi
SMB_EXT_LIB(KRB5,[${KRB5_LIBS}],[${KRB5_CFLAGS}],[${KRB5_CPPFLAGS}],[${KRB5_LDFLAGS}])
SMB_EXT_LIB(KDC,[${KDC_LIBS}],[${KDC_CFLAGS}],[${KDC_CPPFLAGS}],[${KDC_LDFLAGS}])
+15
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
#################################
# Start SUBSYSTEM KERBEROS
[SUBSYSTEM::KERBEROS]
PRIVATE_PROTO_HEADER = proto.h
OBJ_FILES = kerberos.o \
clikrb5.o \
kerberos_heimdal.o \
kerberos_util.o \
kerberos_pac.o \
gssapi_parse.o \
krb5_init_context.o
PUBLIC_DEPENDENCIES = HEIMDAL_KRB5 NDR_KRB5PAC samba-socket LIBCLI_RESOLVE
PRIVATE_DEPENDENCIES = ASN1_UTIL HEIMDAL_ROKEN_ADDRINFO auth_sam CREDENTIALS_KRB5
# End SUBSYSTEM KERBEROS
#################################
+114
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
simple GSSAPI wrappers
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com> 2002
Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2003
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "libcli/util/asn_1.h"
#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
/*
generate a krb5 GSS-API wrapper packet given a ticket
*/
DATA_BLOB gensec_gssapi_gen_krb5_wrap(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const DATA_BLOB *ticket, const uint8_t tok_id[2])
{
struct asn1_data data;
DATA_BLOB ret = data_blob(NULL,0);
if (!ticket->data) {
return ret;
}
ZERO_STRUCT(data);
asn1_push_tag(&data, ASN1_APPLICATION(0));
asn1_write_OID(&data, GENSEC_OID_KERBEROS5);
asn1_write(&data, tok_id, 2);
asn1_write(&data, ticket->data, ticket->length);
asn1_pop_tag(&data);
if (data.has_error) {
DEBUG(1,("Failed to build krb5 wrapper at offset %d\n", (int)data.ofs));
asn1_free(&data);
}
ret = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, data.data, data.length);
asn1_free(&data);
return ret;
}
/*
parse a krb5 GSS-API wrapper packet giving a ticket
*/
BOOL gensec_gssapi_parse_krb5_wrap(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const DATA_BLOB *blob, DATA_BLOB *ticket, uint8_t tok_id[2])
{
BOOL ret;
struct asn1_data data;
int data_remaining;
asn1_load(&data, *blob);
asn1_start_tag(&data, ASN1_APPLICATION(0));
asn1_check_OID(&data, GENSEC_OID_KERBEROS5);
data_remaining = asn1_tag_remaining(&data);
if (data_remaining < 3) {
data.has_error = True;
} else {
asn1_read(&data, tok_id, 2);
data_remaining -= 2;
*ticket = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, data_remaining);
asn1_read(&data, ticket->data, ticket->length);
}
asn1_end_tag(&data);
ret = !data.has_error;
asn1_free(&data);
return ret;
}
/*
check a GSS-API wrapper packet givin an expected OID
*/
BOOL gensec_gssapi_check_oid(const DATA_BLOB *blob, const char *oid)
{
BOOL ret;
struct asn1_data data;
asn1_load(&data, *blob);
asn1_start_tag(&data, ASN1_APPLICATION(0));
asn1_check_OID(&data, GENSEC_OID_KERBEROS5);
ret = !data.has_error;
asn1_free(&data);
return ret;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
AllowedWorkstationNames and Krb5
--------------------------------
Microsoft uses the clientAddresses *multiple value* field in the krb5
protocol (particularly the AS_REQ) to communicate it's netbios name.
This is (my guess) to permit the userWorkstations field to work.
The KDC I imagine checks the netbios address against this value, in
the same way that the Samba server does this.
The checking of this implies a little of the next question:
Is a DAL the layer we need?
---------------------------
Looking at what we need to pass around, I start to seriously wonder if
the DAL is even the right layer - we seem to want to create an account
authorization abstraction layer - is this account permitted to login to
this computer, at this time?
This information in AD is much richer than the Heimdal HDB, and it
seems to make sense to do AD-specific access control checks in an
AD-specific layer, not in the back-end agnostic server.
Because the DAL only reads in the principalName as the key, it has
trouble performing access control decisions on things other than the
name.
I'll be very interested if the DAL really works for eDirectory too.
Perhaps all we need to do is add in the same kludges as we have in
Samba 3.0 for eDirectory. Hmm...
That said, the current layer provides us with a very good start, and
any redefinition would occour from that basis.
GSSAPI layer requirements
-------------------------
Welcome to the wonderful world of canonicalisation
The MIT GSSAPI libs do not support kinit returning a different
realm to what the client asked for, even just in case differences.
Heimdal has the same problem, and this applies to the krb5 layer, not
just gssapi.
We need to test if the canonicalisation is controlled by the KDCOption
flags, windows always sends the Canonicalize flags
Old Clients (samba3 and HPUX clients) uses 'selfmade' gssapi/krb5
for using it in the CIFS session setup. Because they use krb5_mk_req()
they get a chksum field depending on the encryption type, but that's wrong
for GSSAPI (see rfc 1964 section 1.1.1). The Cheksum type 8003
should be used in the Authenticator of the AP-REQ! That allows the channel bindings,
the GCC_C_* req_flags and optional delegation tickets to be passed from the client to the server.
Hower windows doesn't seems to care about if the checksum is of the wrong type,
for CIFS SessionSetups, it seems that the req_flags are just set to 0.
So this can't work for LDAP connections with sign or seal, or for any DCERPC
connection.
So we need to also support old clients!
Principal Names, long and short names
-------------------------------------
As far as servicePrincipalNames are concerned, these are not
canonicalised, except as regards the realm in the reply. That is, the
client gets back the principal it asked for, with the realm portion
'fixed' to uppercase, long form.
The short name of the realm seems to be accepted for at least AS_REQ
operations, but because the server performs canonicalisation, this
causes pain for current client libraries.
The canonicalisation of names matters not only for the KDC, but also
for code that has to deal with keytabs.
We also need to handle type 10 names (NT-ENTERPRISE), which are a full
principal name in the principal field, unrelated to the realm.
HOST/ Aliases
-------------
There is another post somewhere (ref lost for the moment) that details
where in active directory the list of stored aliases for HOST/ is.
This should be read, parsed and used to allow any of these requests to
use the HOST/ key.
For example, this is how HTTP/, DNS/ and CIFS/ can use HOST/ without
any explicit entry.
Jean-Baptiste.Marchand@hsc.fr reminds me:
> This is the SPNMappings attribute in Active Directory:
> http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/adschema/adschema/a_spnmappings.asp
We implement this in hdb-ldb.
Implicit names for Win2000 Accounts
-----------------------------------
Despite not having a DNS name, nor a servicePrincipalName on accounts
created by computers running win2000, it appears we are expected to
have an implicit mapping from host/computer.full.name and
host/computer to it's entry.
Returned Salt for PreAuthentication
-----------------------------------
When the server replies for pre-authentication, it returns the Salt,
which may be in the form of a principalName that is in no way
connected with the current names. (ie, even if the userPrincipalName
and samAccountName are renamed, the old salt is returned).
This is probably the kerberos standard salt, kept in the 'Key'. The
standard generation rules are found in a Mail from Luke Howard dated
10 Nov 2004:
From: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Message-Id: <200411100231.iAA2VLUW006101@au.padl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Organization: PADL Software Pty Ltd
To: lukeh@padl.com
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2004 13:31:21 +1100
Versions: dmail (bsd44) 2.6d/makemail 2.10
Cc: huaraz@moeller.plus.com, samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Subject: Re: Samba-3.0.7-1.3E Active Directory Issues
X-BeenThere: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.4
Precedence: list
Reply-To: lukeh@padl.com
Did some more testing, it appears the behaviour has another
explanation. It appears that the standard Kerberos password salt
algorithm is applied in Windows 2003, just that the source principal
name is different.
Here is what I've been able to deduce from creating a bunch of
different accounts:
Type of account Principal for Salting
========================================================================
Computer Account host/<SAM-Name-Without-$>.realm@REALM
User Account Without UPN <SAM-Name>@REALM
User Account With UPN <LHS-Of-UPN>@REALM
Note that if the computer account's SAM account name does not include
the trailing '$', then the entire SAM account name is used as input to
the salting principal. Setting a UPN for a computer account has no
effect.
It seems to me odd that the RHS of the UPN is not used in the salting
principal. For example, a user with UPN foo@mydomain.com in the realm
MYREALM.COM would have a salt of MYREALM.COMfoo. Perhaps this is to
allow a user's UPN suffix to be changed without changing the salt. And
perhaps using the UPN for salting signifies a move away SAM names and
their associated constraints.
For more information on how UPNs relate to the Kerberos protocol,
see:
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/01dec/I-D/draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-02.txt
-- Luke
--
Heimdal oddities
----------------
Heimdal is built such that it should be able to serve multiple realms
at the same time. This isn't relevant for Samba's use, but it shows
up in a lot of generalisations throughout the code.
Other odd things:
- Support for multiple passwords on a client account: we seem to
call hdb_next_enctype2key() in the pre-authentication routines to
allow multiple passwords per account in krb5. (I think this was
intened to allow multiple salts)
State Machine safety
--------------------
Samba is a giant state machine, and as such have very different
requirements to those traditionally expressed for kerberos and GSSAPI
libraries.
Samba requires all of the libraries it uses to be state machine safe in
their use of internal data. This does not mean thread safe, and an
application could be thread safe, but not state machine safe (if it
instead used thread-local variables).
So, what does it mean for a library to be state machine safe? This is
mostly a question of context, and how the library manages whatever
internal state machines it has. If the library uses a context
variable, passed in by the caller, which contains all the information
about the current state of the library, then it is safe. An example
of this state is the sequence number and session keys for an ongoing
encrypted session).
The other issue affecting state machines is 'blocking' (waiting for a
read on a network socket).
Heimdal has this 'state machine safety' in parts, and we have modified
the lorikeet branch to improve this behviour, when using a new,
non-standard API.
Heimdal uses a per-context variable for the 'krb5_auth_context', which
controls the ongoing encrypted connection, but does use global
variables for the ubiquitous krb5_context parameter.
The modification that has added most to 'state machine safety' of
GSSAPI is the addition of the gsskrb5_acquire_creds function. This
allows the caller to specify a keytab and ccache, for use by the
GSSAPI code. Therefore there is no need to use global variables to
communicate this information.
At a more theoritical level (simply counting static and global
variables) Heimdal is not state machine safe for the GSSAPI layer.
The Krb5 layer alone is much closer, as far as I can tell, blocking
excepted. .
To deal with blocking, we could have a fork()ed child per context,
using the 'GSSAPI export context' function to transfer
the GSSAPI state back into the main code for the wrap()/unwrap() part
of the operation. This will still hit issues of static storage (one
gss_krb5_context per process, and multiple GSSAPI encrypted sessions
at a time) but these may not matter in practice.
In the short-term, we deal with blocking by taking over the network
send() and recv() functions, therefore making them 'semi-async'. This
doens't apply to DNS yet.
GSSAPI and Kerberos extensions
------------------------------
This is a general list of the other extensions we have made to / need from
the kerberos libraries
- DCE_STYLE
- gsskrb5_get_initiator_subkey() (return the exact key that Samba3
has always asked for. gsskrb5_get_subkey() might do what we need
anyway)
- gsskrb5_acquire_creds() (takes keytab and/or ccache as input
parameters, see keytab and state machine discussion)
- gss_krb5_copy_service_keyblock() (get the key used to actually
encrypt the ticket to the server, because the same key is used for
the PAC validation).
- gsskrb5_extract_authtime_from_sec_context (get authtime from
kerberos ticket)
- gsskrb5_extract_authz_data_from_sec_context (get authdata from
ticket, ie the PAC. Must unwrap the data if in an AD-IFRELEVENT)
- gsskrb5_wrap_size (find out how big the wrapped packet will be,
given input length).
Keytab requirements
-------------------
Because windows machine account handling is very different to the
tranditional 'MIT' keytab operation. This starts when we look at the
basis of the secrets handling:
Traditional 'MIT' behaviour is to use a keytab, continaing salted key
data, extracted from the KDC. (In this modal, there is no 'service
password', instead the keys are often simply application of random
bytes). Heimdal also implements this behaviour.
The windows modal is very different - instead of sharing a keytab with
each member server, a password is stored for the whole machine. The
password is set with non-kerberos mechanisms (particularly SAMR, a
DCE-RPC service) and when interacting on a kerberos basis, the
password is salted by the client. (That is, no salt infromation
appears to be convayed from the KDC to the member).
In dealing with this modal, we leverage both the traditional file
keytab and in-MEMORY keytabs.
When dealing with a windows KDC, the behaviour regarding case
sensitivity and canonacolisation must be accomidated. This means that
an incoming request to a member server may have a wide variety of
service principal names. These include:
machine$@REALM (samba clients)
HOST/foo.bar@realm (win2k clients)
HOST/foo@realm (win2k clients, using netbios)
cifs/foo.bar@realm (winxp clients)
cifs/foo@realm (winxp clients, using netbios)
as well as all case variations on the above.
Because that all got 'too hard' to put into a keytab in the
traditional way (with the client to specify the name), we either
pre-compute the keys into a traditional keytab or make an in-MEMORY
keytab at run time. In both cases we specifiy the principal name to
GSSAPI, which avoids the need to store duplicate principals.
We use a 'private' keytab in our private dir, referenced from the
secrets.ldb by default.
Extra Heimdal functions used
----------------------------
(an attempt to list some of the Heimdal-specific functions I know we use)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents()
also a raft of prinicpal manipulation functions:
Prncipal Manipulation
---------------------
Samba makes extensive use of the principal manipulation functions in
Heimdal, including the known structure behind krb_principal and
krb5_realm (a char *).
Authz data extraction
---------------------
We use krb5_ticket_get_authorization_data_type(), and expect it to
return the correct authz data, even if wrapped in an AD-IFRELEVENT container.
KDC/hdb Extensions
--------------
We have modified Heimdal's 'hdb' interface to specify the 'type' of
Principal being requested. This allows us to correctly behave with
the different 'classes' of Principal name.
We currently define 2 classes:
- client (kinit)
- server (tgt)
I also now specify the kerberos principal as an explict parameter, not
an in/out value on the entry itself.
Inside hdb-ldb, we add krbtgt as a special class of principal, because
of particular special-case backend requirements.
Callbacks:
In addition, I have added a new interface hdb_fetch_ex(), which
returns a structure including callbacks, which provide the hook for
the PAC, as well as a callback into the main access control routines.
A new callback should be added to increment the bad password counter
on failure.
Another possability for a callback is to obtain the keys. This would
allow the plaintext password to only be hashed into the encryption
types we need. This idea from the eDirectory/MIT DAL work.
This probably should be combined with storing the hashed passwords in
the supplementalCredentials attribute. If combined with a kvno
parameter, this could also allow changing of the krbtgt password
(valuable for security).
libkdc
------
Samba4 needs to be built as a single binary (design requirement), and
this should include the KDC. Samba also (and perhaps more
importantly) needs to control the configuration environment of the
KDC.
The interface we have defined for libkdc allow for packet injection
into the post-socket layer, with a defined krb5_context and
kdb5_kdc_configuration structure. These effectively redirect the
kerberos warnings, logging and database calls as we require.
Using our socket lib
--------------------
An important detail in the use of libkdc is that we use our own socket
lib. This allows the KDC code to be as portable as the rest of samba
(this cuts both ways), but far more importantly it ensures a
consistancy in the handling of requests, binding to sockets etc.
To handle TCP, we use of our socket layer in much the same way as
we deal with TCP for CIFS. Tridge created a generic packet handling
layer for this.
For the client, we likewise must take over the socket functions, so
that our single thread smbd will not lock up talking to itself. (We
allow processing while waiting for packets in our socket routines).
Kerberos logging support
------------------------
Samba now (optionally in the main code, required for the KDC) uses the
krb5_log_facility from Heimdal. This allows us to redirect the
warnings and status from the KDC (and client/server kerberos code) to
Samba's DEBUG() system.
Similarly important is the Heimdal-specific krb5_get_error_string()
function, which does a lot to reduce the 'administrator pain' level,
by providing specific, english text-string error messages instead of
just error code translations.
Short name rules
----------------
Samba is highly likely to be misconfigured, in many weird and
interesting ways. As such, we have a patch for Heimdal that avoids
DNS lookups on names without a . in them. This should avoid some
delay and root server load.
PAC Correctness
---------------
We now put the PAC into the TGT, not just the service ticket.
Forwarded tickets
-----------------
We extract forwarded tickets from the GSSAPI layer, and put
them into the credentials. We can then use them for proxy work.
Kerberos TODO
=============
(Feel free to contribute to any of these tasks, or ask
abartlet@samba.org about them).
Lockout Control
--------------
We need to get (either if PADL publishes their patch, or write our
own) access control hooks in the Heimdal KDC. We need to lockout
accounts, and perform other controls.
Gssmonger
---------
Microsoft has released a testsuite called gssmonger, which tests
interop. We should compile it against lorikeet-heimdal, MIT and see
if we can build a 'Samba4' server for it.
Kpasswd server
--------------
I have a partial kpasswd server which needs finishing, and a we need a
client testsuite written, either via the krb5 API or directly against
GENSEC and the ASN.1 routines.
Currently it only works for Heimdal, not MIT clients. This may be due
to call ordering constraints.
Correct TCP support
-------------------
Our current TCP support does not send back 'too large' error messages
if the high bit is set. This is needed for a proposed extension
mechanism, but is likewise unsupported in both current Heimdal and MIT.
+124
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@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
kerberos utility library
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
Copyright (C) Remus Koos 2001
Copyright (C) Nalin Dahyabhai 2004.
Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2004.
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "roken.h"
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
/*
simulate a kinit, putting the tgt in the given credentials cache.
Orignally by remus@snapserver.com
This version is built to use a keyblock, rather than needing the
original password.
*/
int kerberos_kinit_keyblock_cc(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache cc,
krb5_principal principal, krb5_keyblock *keyblock,
time_t *expire_time, time_t *kdc_time)
{
krb5_error_code code = 0;
krb5_creds my_creds;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt options;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(&options);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags(ctx, NULL, NULL, &options);
if ((code = krb5_get_init_creds_keyblock(ctx, &my_creds, principal, keyblock,
0, NULL, &options))) {
return code;
}
if ((code = krb5_cc_initialize(ctx, cc, principal))) {
krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &my_creds);
return code;
}
if ((code = krb5_cc_store_cred(ctx, cc, &my_creds))) {
krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &my_creds);
return code;
}
if (expire_time) {
*expire_time = (time_t) my_creds.times.endtime;
}
if (kdc_time) {
*kdc_time = (time_t) my_creds.times.starttime;
}
krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &my_creds);
return 0;
}
/*
simulate a kinit, putting the tgt in the given credentials cache.
Orignally by remus@snapserver.com
*/
int kerberos_kinit_password_cc(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache cc,
krb5_principal principal, const char *password,
time_t *expire_time, time_t *kdc_time)
{
krb5_error_code code = 0;
krb5_creds my_creds;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt options;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(&options);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags(ctx, NULL, NULL, &options);
if ((code = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &my_creds, principal, password,
NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, &options))) {
return code;
}
if ((code = krb5_cc_initialize(ctx, cc, principal))) {
krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &my_creds);
return code;
}
if ((code = krb5_cc_store_cred(ctx, cc, &my_creds))) {
krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &my_creds);
return code;
}
if (expire_time) {
*expire_time = (time_t) my_creds.times.endtime;
}
if (kdc_time) {
*kdc_time = (time_t) my_creds.times.starttime;
}
krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &my_creds);
return 0;
}
#endif
+158
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@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
simple kerberos5 routines for active directory
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2002-2003
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5)
#include "auth/kerberos/krb5_init_context.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/krb5pac.h"
struct auth_serversupplied_info;
struct cli_credentials;
struct ccache_container {
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
krb5_ccache ccache;
};
struct keytab_container {
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
krb5_keytab keytab;
};
/* not really ASN.1, but RFC 1964 */
#define TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REQ ((const uint8_t *)"\x01\x00")
#define TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP ((const uint8_t *)"\x02\x00")
#define TOK_ID_KRB_ERROR ((const uint8_t *)"\x03\x00")
#define TOK_ID_GSS_GETMIC ((const uint8_t *)"\x01\x01")
#define TOK_ID_GSS_WRAP ((const uint8_t *)"\x02\x01")
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_KEYVALUE
#define KRB5_KEY_TYPE(k) ((k)->keytype)
#define KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(k) ((k)->keyvalue.length)
#define KRB5_KEY_DATA(k) ((k)->keyvalue.data)
#else
#define KRB5_KEY_TYPE(k) ((k)->enctype)
#define KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(k) ((k)->length)
#define KRB5_KEY_DATA(k) ((k)->contents)
#endif /* HAVE_KRB5_KEYBLOCK_KEYVALUE */
#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_SET_REAL_TIME
krb5_error_code krb5_set_real_time(krb5_context context, int32_t seconds, int32_t microseconds);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_SET_DEFAULT_TGS_KTYPES
krb5_error_code krb5_set_default_tgs_ktypes(krb5_context ctx, const krb5_enctype *enc);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_AUTH_CON_SETKEY) && !defined(HAVE_KRB5_AUTH_CON_SETUSERUSERKEY)
krb5_error_code krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context, krb5_keyblock *keyblock);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_UNPARSED_NAME
void krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb5_context ctx, char *val);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_COMP_STRING) && !defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINC_COMPONENT)
const krb5_data *krb5_princ_component(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal, int i );
#endif
/* Samba wrapper function for krb5 functionality. */
void setup_kaddr( krb5_address *pkaddr, struct sockaddr *paddr);
int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context, krb5_principal host_princ, krb5_data *password, krb5_keyblock *key, krb5_enctype enctype);
int create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(krb5_context context, krb5_principal host_princ, krb5_data *password, krb5_keyblock *key, krb5_enctype enctype);
krb5_const_principal get_principal_from_tkt(krb5_ticket *tkt);
krb5_error_code get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype **enctypes);
void free_kerberos_etypes(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype *enctypes);
BOOL get_krb5_smb_session_key(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context, DATA_BLOB *session_key, BOOL remote);
krb5_error_code ads_krb5_mk_req(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
const krb5_flags ap_req_options,
const char *principal,
krb5_ccache ccache,
krb5_data *outbuf);
BOOL get_auth_data_from_tkt(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB *auth_data, krb5_ticket *tkt);
NTSTATUS ads_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
struct cli_credentials *machine_account,
const char *service,
const DATA_BLOB *enc_ticket,
krb5_ticket **tkt,
DATA_BLOB *ap_rep,
krb5_keyblock **keyblock);
int kerberos_kinit_password_cc(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache cc,
krb5_principal principal, const char *password,
time_t *expire_time, time_t *kdc_time);
int kerberos_kinit_keyblock_cc(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache cc,
krb5_principal principal, krb5_keyblock *keyblock,
time_t *expire_time, time_t *kdc_time);
krb5_principal kerberos_fetch_salt_princ_for_host_princ(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
int enctype);
void kerberos_set_creds_enctype(krb5_creds *pcreds, int enctype);
BOOL kerberos_compatible_enctypes(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype enctype1, krb5_enctype enctype2);
void kerberos_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *pdata);
krb5_error_code smb_krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab_entry *kt_entry);
char *smb_get_krb5_error_message(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx);
krb5_error_code kinit_to_ccache(TALLOC_CTX *parent_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *credentials,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
krb5_ccache ccache);
krb5_error_code principal_from_credentials(TALLOC_CTX *parent_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *credentials,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
krb5_principal *princ);
NTSTATUS kerberos_decode_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct PAC_DATA **pac_data_out,
DATA_BLOB blob,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
krb5_const_principal client_principal,
time_t tgs_authtime,
krb5_error_code *k5ret);
NTSTATUS kerberos_pac_logon_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO **logon_info,
DATA_BLOB blob,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
krb5_const_principal client_principal,
time_t tgs_authtime,
krb5_error_code *k5ret);
krb5_error_code kerberos_encode_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct PAC_DATA *pac_data,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
DATA_BLOB *pac);
krb5_error_code kerberos_create_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
krb5_principal client_principal,
time_t tgs_authtime,
DATA_BLOB *pac);
#include "auth/kerberos/proto.h"
#endif /* HAVE_KRB5 */
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1997 - 2006 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* This file for code taken from the Heimdal code, to preserve licence */
/* Modified by Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> */
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
/* Taken from accept_sec_context.c,v 1.65 */
krb5_error_code smb_rd_req_return_stuff(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
const krb5_data *inbuf,
krb5_keytab keytab,
krb5_principal acceptor_principal,
krb5_data *outbuf,
krb5_ticket **ticket,
krb5_keyblock **keyblock)
{
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx in = NULL;
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx out = NULL;
krb5_error_code kret;
*keyblock = NULL;
*ticket = NULL;
outbuf->length = 0;
outbuf->data = NULL;
kret = krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_alloc(context, &in);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_in_set_keytab(context, in, keytab);
if (kret) {
if (in)
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_free(context, in);
return kret;
}
kret = krb5_rd_req_ctx(context,
auth_context,
inbuf,
acceptor_principal,
in, &out);
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_free(context, in);
if (kret) {
return kret;
}
/*
* We need to remember some data on the context_handle.
*/
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_ticket(context, out,
ticket);
if (kret == 0) {
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_keyblock(context, out,
keyblock);
}
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx_free(context, out);
if (kret == 0) {
kret = krb5_mk_rep(context, *auth_context, outbuf);
}
if (kret) {
krb5_free_ticket(context, *ticket);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, *keyblock);
krb5_data_free(outbuf);
}
return kret;
}
+617
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@@ -0,0 +1,617 @@
/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Create and parse the krb5 PAC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2002-2003
Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2004-2005
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h"
#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
static krb5_error_code check_pac_checksum(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
DATA_BLOB pac_data,
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *sig,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto crypto;
Checksum cksum;
cksum.cksumtype = (CKSUMTYPE)sig->type;
cksum.checksum.length = sig->signature.length;
cksum.checksum.data = sig->signature.data;
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context,
keyblock,
0,
&crypto);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(0,("krb5_crypto_init() failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM,
pac_data.data,
pac_data.length,
&cksum);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
return ret;
}
NTSTATUS kerberos_decode_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct PAC_DATA **pac_data_out,
DATA_BLOB blob,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
krb5_const_principal client_principal,
time_t tgs_authtime,
krb5_error_code *k5ret)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS status;
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *srv_sig_ptr = NULL;
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *kdc_sig_ptr = NULL;
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *srv_sig_wipe = NULL;
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *kdc_sig_wipe = NULL;
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
struct PAC_LOGON_NAME *logon_name = NULL;
struct PAC_DATA *pac_data;
struct PAC_DATA_RAW *pac_data_raw;
DATA_BLOB *srv_sig_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *kdc_sig_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB modified_pac_blob;
NTTIME tgs_authtime_nttime;
krb5_principal client_principal_pac;
int i;
krb5_clear_error_string(context);
if (k5ret) {
*k5ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
}
pac_data = talloc(mem_ctx, struct PAC_DATA);
pac_data_raw = talloc(mem_ctx, struct PAC_DATA_RAW);
kdc_sig_wipe = talloc(mem_ctx, struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
srv_sig_wipe = talloc(mem_ctx, struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
if (!pac_data_raw || !pac_data || !kdc_sig_wipe || !srv_sig_wipe) {
if (k5ret) {
*k5ret = ENOMEM;
}
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
status = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, pac_data, pac_data,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_DATA);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC\n"));
return status;
}
if (pac_data->num_buffers < 4) {
/* we need logon_ingo, service_key and kdc_key */
DEBUG(0,("less than 4 PAC buffers\n"));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
status = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, pac_data_raw, pac_data_raw,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_DATA_RAW);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC\n"));
return status;
}
if (pac_data_raw->num_buffers < 4) {
/* we need logon_ingo, service_key and kdc_key */
DEBUG(0,("less than 4 PAC buffers\n"));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (pac_data->num_buffers != pac_data_raw->num_buffers) {
/* we need logon_ingo, service_key and kdc_key */
DEBUG(0,("misparse! PAC_DATA has %d buffers while PAC_DATA_RAW has %d\n",
pac_data->num_buffers, pac_data_raw->num_buffers));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
for (i=0; i < pac_data->num_buffers; i++) {
if (pac_data->buffers[i].type != pac_data_raw->buffers[i].type) {
DEBUG(0,("misparse! PAC_DATA buffer %d has type %d while PAC_DATA_RAW has %d\n",
i, pac_data->buffers[i].type, pac_data->buffers[i].type));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
switch (pac_data->buffers[i].type) {
case PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO:
if (!pac_data->buffers[i].info) {
break;
}
logon_info = pac_data->buffers[i].info->logon_info.info;
break;
case PAC_TYPE_SRV_CHECKSUM:
if (!pac_data->buffers[i].info) {
break;
}
srv_sig_ptr = &pac_data->buffers[i].info->srv_cksum;
srv_sig_blob = &pac_data_raw->buffers[i].info->remaining;
break;
case PAC_TYPE_KDC_CHECKSUM:
if (!pac_data->buffers[i].info) {
break;
}
kdc_sig_ptr = &pac_data->buffers[i].info->kdc_cksum;
kdc_sig_blob = &pac_data_raw->buffers[i].info->remaining;
break;
case PAC_TYPE_LOGON_NAME:
logon_name = &pac_data->buffers[i].info->logon_name;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (!logon_info) {
DEBUG(0,("PAC no logon_info\n"));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (!logon_name) {
DEBUG(0,("PAC no logon_name\n"));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (!srv_sig_ptr || !srv_sig_blob) {
DEBUG(0,("PAC no srv_key\n"));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (!kdc_sig_ptr || !kdc_sig_blob) {
DEBUG(0,("PAC no kdc_key\n"));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* Find and zero out the signatures, as required by the signing algorithm */
/* We find the data blobs above, now we parse them to get at the exact portion we should zero */
status = ndr_pull_struct_blob(kdc_sig_blob, kdc_sig_wipe, kdc_sig_wipe,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the KDC signature\n"));
return status;
}
status = ndr_pull_struct_blob(srv_sig_blob, srv_sig_wipe, srv_sig_wipe,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the SRV signature\n"));
return status;
}
/* Now zero the decoded structure */
memset(kdc_sig_wipe->signature.data, '\0', kdc_sig_wipe->signature.length);
memset(srv_sig_wipe->signature.data, '\0', srv_sig_wipe->signature.length);
/* and reencode, back into the same place it came from */
status = ndr_push_struct_blob(kdc_sig_blob, pac_data_raw, kdc_sig_wipe,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0,("can't repack the KDC signature\n"));
return status;
}
status = ndr_push_struct_blob(srv_sig_blob, pac_data_raw, srv_sig_wipe,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0,("can't repack the SRV signature\n"));
return status;
}
/* push out the whole structure, but now with zero'ed signatures */
status = ndr_push_struct_blob(&modified_pac_blob, pac_data_raw, pac_data_raw,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_DATA_RAW);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0,("can't repack the RAW PAC\n"));
return status;
}
/* verify by service_key */
ret = check_pac_checksum(mem_ctx,
modified_pac_blob, srv_sig_ptr,
context,
service_keyblock);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("PAC Decode: Failed to verify the service signature: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
if (k5ret) {
*k5ret = ret;
}
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
if (krbtgt_keyblock) {
ret = check_pac_checksum(mem_ctx,
srv_sig_ptr->signature, kdc_sig_ptr,
context, krbtgt_keyblock);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("PAC Decode: Failed to verify the KDC signature: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
if (k5ret) {
*k5ret = ret;
}
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
/* Convert to NT time, so as not to loose accuracy in comparison */
unix_to_nt_time(&tgs_authtime_nttime, tgs_authtime);
if (tgs_authtime_nttime != logon_name->logon_time) {
DEBUG(2, ("PAC Decode: Logon time mismatch between ticket and PAC!\n"));
DEBUG(2, ("PAC Decode: PAC: %s\n", nt_time_string(mem_ctx, logon_name->logon_time)));
DEBUG(2, ("PAC Decode: Ticket: %s\n", nt_time_string(mem_ctx, tgs_authtime_nttime)));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
ret = krb5_parse_name_flags(context, logon_name->account_name, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_PARSE_NO_REALM,
&client_principal_pac);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(2, ("Could not parse name from incoming PAC: [%s]: %s\n",
logon_name->account_name,
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
if (k5ret) {
*k5ret = ret;
}
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (!krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, client_principal, client_principal_pac)) {
DEBUG(2, ("Name in PAC [%s] does not match principal name in ticket\n",
logon_name->account_name));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
#if 0
if (strcasecmp(logon_info->info3.base.account_name.string,
"Administrator")== 0) {
file_save("tmp_pac_data-admin.dat",blob.data,blob.length);
}
#endif
DEBUG(3,("Found account name from PAC: %s [%s]\n",
logon_info->info3.base.account_name.string,
logon_info->info3.base.full_name.string));
*pac_data_out = pac_data;
return status;
}
_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS kerberos_pac_logon_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO **logon_info,
DATA_BLOB blob,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
krb5_const_principal client_principal,
time_t tgs_authtime,
krb5_error_code *k5ret)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct PAC_DATA *pac_data;
int i;
nt_status = kerberos_decode_pac(mem_ctx, &pac_data,
blob,
context,
krbtgt_keyblock,
service_keyblock,
client_principal,
tgs_authtime,
k5ret);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return nt_status;
}
*logon_info = NULL;
for (i=0; i < pac_data->num_buffers; i++) {
if (pac_data->buffers[i].type != PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO) {
continue;
}
*logon_info = pac_data->buffers[i].info->logon_info.info;
}
if (!*logon_info) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static krb5_error_code make_pac_checksum(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
DATA_BLOB *pac_data,
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *sig,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto crypto;
Checksum cksum;
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context,
keyblock,
0,
&crypto);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(0,("krb5_crypto_init() failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_create_checksum(context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM,
0,
pac_data->data,
pac_data->length,
&cksum);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(2, ("PAC Verification failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
}
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
sig->type = cksum.cksumtype;
sig->signature = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, cksum.checksum.data, cksum.checksum.length);
free_Checksum(&cksum);
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code kerberos_encode_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct PAC_DATA *pac_data,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
DATA_BLOB *pac)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
krb5_error_code ret;
DATA_BLOB zero_blob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
DATA_BLOB tmp_blob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *kdc_checksum = NULL;
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *srv_checksum = NULL;
int i;
/* First, just get the keytypes filled in (and lengths right, eventually) */
for (i=0; i < pac_data->num_buffers; i++) {
if (pac_data->buffers[i].type != PAC_TYPE_KDC_CHECKSUM) {
continue;
}
kdc_checksum = &pac_data->buffers[i].info->kdc_cksum,
ret = make_pac_checksum(mem_ctx, &zero_blob,
kdc_checksum,
context, krbtgt_keyblock);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(2, ("making krbtgt PAC checksum failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ret;
}
}
for (i=0; i < pac_data->num_buffers; i++) {
if (pac_data->buffers[i].type != PAC_TYPE_SRV_CHECKSUM) {
continue;
}
srv_checksum = &pac_data->buffers[i].info->srv_cksum;
ret = make_pac_checksum(mem_ctx, &zero_blob,
srv_checksum,
context, service_keyblock);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(2, ("making service PAC checksum failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ret;
}
}
if (!kdc_checksum) {
DEBUG(2, ("Invalid PAC constructed for signing, no KDC checksum present!"));
return EINVAL;
}
if (!srv_checksum) {
DEBUG(2, ("Invalid PAC constructed for signing, no SRV checksum present!"));
return EINVAL;
}
/* But wipe out the actual signatures */
memset(kdc_checksum->signature.data, '\0', kdc_checksum->signature.length);
memset(srv_checksum->signature.data, '\0', srv_checksum->signature.length);
nt_status = ndr_push_struct_blob(&tmp_blob, mem_ctx, pac_data,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_DATA);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(1, ("PAC (presig) push failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return EINVAL;
}
/* Then sign the result of the previous push, where the sig was zero'ed out */
ret = make_pac_checksum(mem_ctx, &tmp_blob, srv_checksum,
context, service_keyblock);
/* Then sign Server checksum */
ret = make_pac_checksum(mem_ctx, &srv_checksum->signature, kdc_checksum, context, krbtgt_keyblock);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(2, ("making krbtgt PAC checksum failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ret;
}
/* And push it out again, this time to the world. This relies on determanistic pointer values */
nt_status = ndr_push_struct_blob(&tmp_blob, mem_ctx, pac_data,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_DATA);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(1, ("PAC (final) push failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return EINVAL;
}
*pac = tmp_blob;
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code kerberos_create_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
krb5_principal client_principal,
time_t tgs_authtime,
DATA_BLOB *pac)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct PAC_DATA *pac_data = talloc(mem_ctx, struct PAC_DATA);
struct netr_SamInfo3 *sam3;
union PAC_INFO *u_LOGON_INFO;
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *LOGON_INFO;
union PAC_INFO *u_LOGON_NAME;
struct PAC_LOGON_NAME *LOGON_NAME;
union PAC_INFO *u_KDC_CHECKSUM;
union PAC_INFO *u_SRV_CHECKSUM;
char *name;
enum {
PAC_BUF_LOGON_INFO = 0,
PAC_BUF_LOGON_NAME = 1,
PAC_BUF_SRV_CHECKSUM = 2,
PAC_BUF_KDC_CHECKSUM = 3,
PAC_BUF_NUM_BUFFERS = 4
};
if (!pac_data) {
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_data->num_buffers = PAC_BUF_NUM_BUFFERS;
pac_data->version = 0;
pac_data->buffers = talloc_array(pac_data,
struct PAC_BUFFER,
pac_data->num_buffers);
if (!pac_data->buffers) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
/* LOGON_INFO */
u_LOGON_INFO = talloc_zero(pac_data->buffers, union PAC_INFO);
if (!u_LOGON_INFO) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_LOGON_INFO].type = PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO;
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_LOGON_INFO].info = u_LOGON_INFO;
/* LOGON_NAME */
u_LOGON_NAME = talloc_zero(pac_data->buffers, union PAC_INFO);
if (!u_LOGON_NAME) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_LOGON_NAME].type = PAC_TYPE_LOGON_NAME;
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_LOGON_NAME].info = u_LOGON_NAME;
LOGON_NAME = &u_LOGON_NAME->logon_name;
/* SRV_CHECKSUM */
u_SRV_CHECKSUM = talloc_zero(pac_data->buffers, union PAC_INFO);
if (!u_SRV_CHECKSUM) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_SRV_CHECKSUM].type = PAC_TYPE_SRV_CHECKSUM;
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_SRV_CHECKSUM].info = u_SRV_CHECKSUM;
/* KDC_CHECKSUM */
u_KDC_CHECKSUM = talloc_zero(pac_data->buffers, union PAC_INFO);
if (!u_KDC_CHECKSUM) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_KDC_CHECKSUM].type = PAC_TYPE_KDC_CHECKSUM;
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_KDC_CHECKSUM].info = u_KDC_CHECKSUM;
/* now the real work begins... */
LOGON_INFO = talloc_zero(u_LOGON_INFO, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
if (!LOGON_INFO) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
nt_status = auth_convert_server_info_saminfo3(LOGON_INFO, server_info, &sam3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Getting Samba info failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return EINVAL;
}
u_LOGON_INFO->logon_info.info = LOGON_INFO;
LOGON_INFO->info3 = *sam3;
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, client_principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &name);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
LOGON_NAME->account_name = talloc_strdup(LOGON_NAME, name);
free(name);
/*
this logon_time field is absolutely critical. This is what
caused all our PAC troubles :-)
*/
unix_to_nt_time(&LOGON_NAME->logon_time, tgs_authtime);
ret = kerberos_encode_pac(mem_ctx,
pac_data,
context,
krbtgt_keyblock,
service_keyblock,
pac);
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ret;
}
+700
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,700 @@
/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Kerberos utility functions for GENSEC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
#include "auth/credentials/credentials_krb5.h"
struct principal_container {
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
krb5_principal principal;
};
static int free_principal(struct principal_container *pc)
{
/* current heimdal - 0.6.3, which we need anyway, fixes segfaults here */
krb5_free_principal(pc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, pc->principal);
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code salt_principal_from_credentials(TALLOC_CTX *parent_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *machine_account,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
krb5_principal *salt_princ)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
char *machine_username;
char *salt_body;
char *lower_realm;
const char *salt_principal;
struct principal_container *mem_ctx = talloc(parent_ctx, struct principal_container);
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
salt_principal = cli_credentials_get_salt_principal(machine_account);
if (salt_principal) {
ret = krb5_parse_name(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, salt_principal, salt_princ);
} else {
machine_username = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, cli_credentials_get_username(machine_account));
if (!machine_username) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ENOMEM;
}
if (machine_username[strlen(machine_username)-1] == '$') {
machine_username[strlen(machine_username)-1] = '\0';
}
lower_realm = strlower_talloc(mem_ctx, cli_credentials_get_realm(machine_account));
if (!lower_realm) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ENOMEM;
}
salt_body = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s.%s", machine_username,
lower_realm);
if (!salt_body) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = krb5_make_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, salt_princ,
cli_credentials_get_realm(machine_account),
"host", salt_body, NULL);
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* This song-and-dance effectivly puts the principal
* into talloc, so we can't loose it. */
mem_ctx->smb_krb5_context = talloc_reference(mem_ctx, smb_krb5_context);
mem_ctx->principal = *salt_princ;
talloc_set_destructor(mem_ctx, free_principal);
}
return ret;
}
/* Obtain the principal set on this context. Requires a
* smb_krb5_context because we are doing krb5 principal parsing with
* the library routines. The returned princ is placed in the talloc
* system by means of a destructor (do *not* free). */
krb5_error_code principal_from_credentials(TALLOC_CTX *parent_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *credentials,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
krb5_principal *princ)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
const char *princ_string;
struct principal_container *mem_ctx = talloc(parent_ctx, struct principal_container);
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
princ_string = cli_credentials_get_principal(credentials, mem_ctx);
/* A NULL here has meaning, as the gssapi server case will
* then use the principal from the client */
if (!princ_string) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
princ = NULL;
return 0;
}
ret = krb5_parse_name(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
princ_string, princ);
if (ret == 0) {
/* This song-and-dance effectivly puts the principal
* into talloc, so we can't loose it. */
mem_ctx->smb_krb5_context = talloc_reference(mem_ctx, smb_krb5_context);
mem_ctx->principal = *princ;
talloc_set_destructor(mem_ctx, free_principal);
}
return ret;
}
/**
* Return a freshly allocated ccache (destroyed by destructor on child
* of parent_ctx), for a given set of client credentials
*/
krb5_error_code kinit_to_ccache(TALLOC_CTX *parent_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *credentials,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
krb5_ccache ccache)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
const char *password;
time_t kdc_time = 0;
krb5_principal princ;
int tries;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(parent_ctx);
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = principal_from_credentials(mem_ctx, credentials, smb_krb5_context, &princ);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
password = cli_credentials_get_password(credentials);
tries = 2;
while (tries--) {
if (password) {
ret = kerberos_kinit_password_cc(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, ccache,
princ,
password, NULL, &kdc_time);
} else {
/* No password available, try to use a keyblock instead */
krb5_keyblock keyblock;
const struct samr_Password *mach_pwd;
mach_pwd = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(credentials, mem_ctx);
if (!mach_pwd) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
DEBUG(1, ("kinit_to_ccache: No password available for kinit\n"));
return EINVAL;
}
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
mach_pwd->hash, sizeof(mach_pwd->hash),
&keyblock);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = kerberos_kinit_keyblock_cc(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, ccache,
princ,
&keyblock, NULL, &kdc_time);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &keyblock);
}
}
if (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW || ret == KRB5_KDCREP_SKEW) {
/* Perhaps we have been given an invalid skew, so try again without it */
time_t t = time(NULL);
krb5_set_real_time(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, t, 0);
} else {
/* not a skew problem */
break;
}
}
if (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW || ret == KRB5_KDCREP_SKEW) {
DEBUG(1,("kinit for %s failed (%s)\n",
cli_credentials_get_principal(credentials, mem_ctx),
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* cope with ticket being in the future due to clock skew */
if ((unsigned)kdc_time > time(NULL)) {
time_t t = time(NULL);
int time_offset =(unsigned)kdc_time-t;
DEBUG(4,("Advancing clock by %d seconds to cope with clock skew\n", time_offset));
krb5_set_real_time(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, t + time_offset + 1, 0);
}
if (ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED && cli_credentials_wrong_password(credentials)) {
ret = kinit_to_ccache(parent_ctx,
credentials,
smb_krb5_context,
ccache);
}
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("kinit for %s failed (%s)\n",
cli_credentials_get_principal(credentials, mem_ctx),
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
static int free_keytab(struct keytab_container *ktc)
{
krb5_kt_close(ktc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, ktc->keytab);
return 0;
}
int smb_krb5_open_keytab(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
const char *keytab_name, struct keytab_container **ktc)
{
krb5_keytab keytab;
int ret;
ret = krb5_kt_resolve(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, keytab_name, &keytab);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("failed to open krb5 keytab: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
return ret;
}
*ktc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct keytab_container);
if (!*ktc) {
return ENOMEM;
}
(*ktc)->smb_krb5_context = talloc_reference(*ktc, smb_krb5_context);
(*ktc)->keytab = keytab;
talloc_set_destructor(*ktc, free_keytab);
return 0;
}
struct enctypes_container {
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
krb5_enctype *enctypes;
};
static int free_enctypes(struct enctypes_container *etc)
{
free_kerberos_etypes(etc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, etc->enctypes);
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code keytab_add_keys(TALLOC_CTX *parent_ctx,
const char *princ_string,
krb5_principal princ,
krb5_principal salt_princ,
int kvno,
const char *password_s,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
krb5_keytab keytab)
{
int i;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_enctype *enctypes;
char *enctype_string;
struct enctypes_container *etc;
krb5_data password;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(parent_ctx);
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
etc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct enctypes_container);
if (!etc) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
&enctypes);
if (ret != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("keytab_add_keys: getting encrption types failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
etc->smb_krb5_context = talloc_reference(etc, smb_krb5_context);
etc->enctypes = enctypes;
talloc_set_destructor(etc, free_enctypes);
password.data = discard_const_p(char *, password_s);
password.length = strlen(password_s);
for (i=0; enctypes[i]; i++) {
krb5_keytab_entry entry;
ret = create_kerberos_key_from_string(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
salt_princ, &password, &entry.keyblock, enctypes[i]);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
entry.principal = princ;
entry.vno = kvno;
ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, keytab, &entry);
enctype_string = NULL;
krb5_enctype_to_string(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, enctypes[i], &enctype_string);
if (ret != 0) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to add %s entry for %s(kvno %d) to keytab: %s\n",
enctype_string,
princ_string,
kvno,
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
free(enctype_string);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &entry.keyblock);
return ret;
}
DEBUG(5, ("Added %s(kvno %d) to keytab (%s)\n",
princ_string, kvno,
enctype_string));
free(enctype_string);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &entry.keyblock);
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return 0;
}
static int create_keytab(TALLOC_CTX *parent_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *machine_account,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
krb5_keytab keytab,
BOOL add_old)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
const char *password_s;
char *enctype_string;
const char *old_secret;
int kvno;
krb5_principal salt_princ;
krb5_principal princ;
const char *princ_string;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(parent_ctx);
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
princ_string = cli_credentials_get_principal(machine_account, mem_ctx);
/* Get the principal we will store the new keytab entries under */
ret = principal_from_credentials(mem_ctx, machine_account, smb_krb5_context, &princ);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("create_keytab: makeing krb5 principal failed (%s)\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* The salt used to generate these entries may be different however, fetch that */
ret = salt_principal_from_credentials(mem_ctx, machine_account,
smb_krb5_context,
&salt_princ);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("create_keytab: makeing salt principal failed (%s)\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Finally, do the dance to get the password to put in the entry */
password_s = cli_credentials_get_password(machine_account);
if (!password_s) {
/* If we don't have the plaintext password, try for
* the MD4 password hash */
krb5_keytab_entry entry;
const struct samr_Password *mach_pwd;
mach_pwd = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(machine_account, mem_ctx);
if (!mach_pwd) {
DEBUG(1, ("create_keytab: Domain trust informaton for account %s not available\n",
cli_credentials_get_principal(machine_account, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return EINVAL;
}
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
mach_pwd->hash, sizeof(mach_pwd->hash),
&entry.keyblock);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("create_keytab: krb5_keyblock_init failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
entry.principal = princ;
entry.vno = cli_credentials_get_kvno(machine_account);
ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, keytab, &entry);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to add ARCFOUR_HMAC (only) entry for %s to keytab: %s",
cli_credentials_get_principal(machine_account, mem_ctx),
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &entry.keyblock);
return ret;
}
krb5_enctype_to_string(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
&enctype_string);
DEBUG(5, ("Added %s(kvno %d) to keytab (%s)\n",
cli_credentials_get_principal(machine_account, mem_ctx),
cli_credentials_get_kvno(machine_account),
enctype_string));
free(enctype_string);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &entry.keyblock);
/* Can't go any further, we only have this one key */
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return 0;
}
kvno = cli_credentials_get_kvno(machine_account);
/* good, we actually have the real plaintext */
ret = keytab_add_keys(mem_ctx, princ_string, princ, salt_princ,
kvno, password_s, smb_krb5_context, keytab);
if (!ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
if (!add_old || kvno == 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return 0;
}
old_secret = cli_credentials_get_old_password(machine_account);
if (!old_secret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return 0;
}
ret = keytab_add_keys(mem_ctx, princ_string, princ, salt_princ,
kvno - 1, old_secret, smb_krb5_context, keytab);
if (!ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return 0;
}
/*
* Walk the keytab, looking for entries of this principal name, with KVNO other than current kvno -1.
*
* These entries are now stale, we only keep the current, and previous entries around.
*
* Inspired by the code in Samba3 for 'use kerberos keytab'.
*
*/
static krb5_error_code remove_old_entries(TALLOC_CTX *parent_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *machine_account,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
krb5_keytab keytab, BOOL *found_previous)
{
krb5_error_code ret, ret2;
krb5_kt_cursor cursor;
krb5_principal princ;
int kvno;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(parent_ctx);
const char *princ_string;
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
*found_previous = False;
princ_string = cli_credentials_get_principal(machine_account, mem_ctx);
/* Get the principal we will store the new keytab entries under */
ret = principal_from_credentials(mem_ctx, machine_account, smb_krb5_context, &princ);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("update_keytab: makeing krb5 principal failed (%s)\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
kvno = cli_credentials_get_kvno(machine_account);
/* for each entry in the keytab */
ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, keytab, &cursor);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
break;
case HEIM_ERR_OPNOTSUPP:
case ENOENT:
case KRB5_KT_END:
/* no point enumerating if there isn't anything here */
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return 0;
default:
DEBUG(1,("failed to open keytab for read of old entries: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
while (!ret) {
krb5_keytab_entry entry;
ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, keytab, &entry, &cursor);
if (ret) {
break;
}
/* if it matches our principal */
if (!krb5_kt_compare(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &entry, princ, 0, 0)) {
/* Free the entry, it wasn't the one we were looking for anyway */
krb5_kt_free_entry(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &entry);
continue;
}
/* delete it, if it is not kvno -1 */
if (entry.vno != (kvno - 1 )) {
/* Release the enumeration. We are going to
* have to start this from the top again,
* because deletes during enumeration may not
* always be consistant.
*
* Also, the enumeration locks a FILE: keytab
*/
krb5_kt_end_seq_get(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, keytab, &cursor);
ret = krb5_kt_remove_entry(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, keytab, &entry);
krb5_kt_free_entry(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &entry);
/* Deleted: Restart from the top */
ret2 = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, keytab, &cursor);
if (ret2) {
krb5_kt_free_entry(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &entry);
DEBUG(1,("failed to restart enumeration of keytab: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret2;
}
if (ret) {
break;
}
} else {
*found_previous = True;
}
/* Free the entry, we don't need it any more */
krb5_kt_free_entry(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &entry);
}
krb5_kt_end_seq_get(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, keytab, &cursor);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
break;
case ENOENT:
case KRB5_KT_END:
ret = 0;
break;
default:
DEBUG(1,("failed in deleting old entries for principal: %s: %s\n",
princ_string,
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
ret, mem_ctx)));
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
int smb_krb5_update_keytab(TALLOC_CTX *parent_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *machine_account,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
struct keytab_container *keytab_container)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
BOOL found_previous;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(parent_ctx);
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = remove_old_entries(mem_ctx, machine_account,
smb_krb5_context, keytab_container->keytab, &found_previous);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Create a new keytab. If during the cleanout we found
* entires for kvno -1, then don't try and duplicate them.
* Otherwise, add kvno, and kvno -1 */
ret = create_keytab(mem_ctx, machine_account, smb_krb5_context,
keytab_container->keytab,
found_previous ? False : True);
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
_PUBLIC_ int smb_krb5_create_memory_keytab(TALLOC_CTX *parent_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *machine_account,
struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
struct keytab_container **keytab_container)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(parent_ctx);
const char *rand_string;
const char *keytab_name;
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
*keytab_container = talloc(mem_ctx, struct keytab_container);
rand_string = generate_random_str(mem_ctx, 16);
if (!rand_string) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ENOMEM;
}
keytab_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "MEMORY:%s",
rand_string);
if (!keytab_name) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = smb_krb5_open_keytab(mem_ctx, smb_krb5_context, keytab_name, keytab_container);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
ret = smb_krb5_update_keytab(mem_ctx, machine_account, smb_krb5_context, *keytab_container);
if (ret == 0) {
talloc_steal(parent_ctx, *keytab_container);
} else {
*keytab_container = NULL;
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Wrapper for krb5_init_context
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2005
Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2004
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#include "lib/socket/socket.h"
#include "system/network.h"
#include "lib/events/events.h"
#include "roken.h"
/*
context structure for operations on cldap packets
*/
struct smb_krb5_socket {
struct socket_context *sock;
/* the fd event */
struct fd_event *fde;
BOOL timeout;
NTSTATUS status;
DATA_BLOB request, reply, partial;
size_t partial_read;
krb5_krbhst_info *hi;
};
static int smb_krb5_context_destroy_1(struct smb_krb5_context *ctx)
{
krb5_free_context(ctx->krb5_context);
return 0;
}
static int smb_krb5_context_destroy_2(struct smb_krb5_context *ctx)
{
/* Otherwise krb5_free_context will try and close what we have already free()ed */
krb5_set_warn_dest(ctx->krb5_context, NULL);
krb5_closelog(ctx->krb5_context, ctx->logf);
smb_krb5_context_destroy_1(ctx);
return 0;
}
/* We never close down the DEBUG system, and no need to unreference the use */
static void smb_krb5_debug_close(void *private) {
return;
}
static void smb_krb5_debug_wrapper(const char *timestr, const char *msg, void *private)
{
DEBUG(2, ("Kerberos: %s\n", msg));
}
/*
handle recv events on a smb_krb5 socket
*/
static void smb_krb5_socket_recv(struct smb_krb5_socket *smb_krb5)
{
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(smb_krb5);
DATA_BLOB blob;
size_t nread, dsize;
switch (smb_krb5->hi->proto) {
case KRB5_KRBHST_UDP:
smb_krb5->status = socket_pending(smb_krb5->sock, &dsize);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(smb_krb5->status)) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return;
}
blob = data_blob_talloc(tmp_ctx, NULL, dsize);
if (blob.data == NULL && dsize != 0) {
smb_krb5->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return;
}
smb_krb5->status = socket_recv(smb_krb5->sock, blob.data, blob.length, &nread);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(smb_krb5->status)) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return;
}
blob.length = nread;
if (nread == 0) {
smb_krb5->status = NT_STATUS_UNEXPECTED_NETWORK_ERROR;
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return;
}
DEBUG(2,("Received smb_krb5 packet of length %d\n",
(int)blob.length));
talloc_steal(smb_krb5, blob.data);
smb_krb5->reply = blob;
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
break;
case KRB5_KRBHST_TCP:
if (smb_krb5->partial.length == 0) {
smb_krb5->partial = data_blob_talloc(smb_krb5, NULL, 4);
if (!smb_krb5->partial.data) {
smb_krb5->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
return;
}
smb_krb5->partial_read = 0;
}
/* read in the packet length */
if (smb_krb5->partial_read < 4) {
uint32_t packet_length;
smb_krb5->status = socket_recv(smb_krb5->sock,
smb_krb5->partial.data + smb_krb5->partial_read,
4 - smb_krb5->partial_read,
&nread);
/* todo: this should be converted to the packet_*() routines */
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(smb_krb5->status)) {
return;
}
smb_krb5->partial_read += nread;
if (smb_krb5->partial_read != 4) {
return;
}
packet_length = RIVAL(smb_krb5->partial.data, 0);
smb_krb5->partial.data = talloc_realloc(smb_krb5, smb_krb5->partial.data,
uint8_t, packet_length + 4);
if (!smb_krb5->partial.data) {
smb_krb5->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
return;
}
smb_krb5->partial.length = packet_length + 4;
}
/* read in the body */
smb_krb5->status = socket_recv(smb_krb5->sock,
smb_krb5->partial.data + smb_krb5->partial_read,
smb_krb5->partial.length - smb_krb5->partial_read,
&nread);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(smb_krb5->status)) return;
smb_krb5->partial_read += nread;
if (smb_krb5->partial_read != smb_krb5->partial.length) return;
smb_krb5->reply = data_blob_talloc(smb_krb5, smb_krb5->partial.data + 4, smb_krb5->partial.length - 4);
break;
case KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP:
return;
}
}
/*
handle request timeouts
*/
static void smb_krb5_request_timeout(struct event_context *event_ctx,
struct timed_event *te, struct timeval t,
void *private)
{
struct smb_krb5_socket *smb_krb5 = talloc_get_type(private, struct smb_krb5_socket);
DEBUG(5,("Timed out smb_krb5 packet\n"));
smb_krb5->timeout = True;
}
/*
handle send events on a smb_krb5 socket
*/
static void smb_krb5_socket_send(struct smb_krb5_socket *smb_krb5)
{
NTSTATUS status;
size_t len;
len = smb_krb5->request.length;
status = socket_send(smb_krb5->sock, &smb_krb5->request, &len);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) return;
EVENT_FD_READABLE(smb_krb5->fde);
EVENT_FD_NOT_WRITEABLE(smb_krb5->fde);
return;
}
/*
handle fd events on a smb_krb5_socket
*/
static void smb_krb5_socket_handler(struct event_context *ev, struct fd_event *fde,
uint16_t flags, void *private)
{
struct smb_krb5_socket *smb_krb5 = talloc_get_type(private, struct smb_krb5_socket);
if (flags & EVENT_FD_WRITE) {
smb_krb5_socket_send(smb_krb5);
}
if (flags & EVENT_FD_READ) {
smb_krb5_socket_recv(smb_krb5);
}
}
krb5_error_code smb_krb5_send_and_recv_func(krb5_context context,
void *data,
krb5_krbhst_info *hi,
const krb5_data *send_buf,
krb5_data *recv_buf)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS status;
struct socket_address *remote_addr;
const char *name;
struct addrinfo *ai, *a;
struct smb_krb5_socket *smb_krb5;
struct event_context *ev = talloc_get_type(data, struct event_context);
DATA_BLOB send_blob = data_blob_const(send_buf->data, send_buf->length);
ret = krb5_krbhst_get_addrinfo(context, hi, &ai);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
for (a = ai; a; a = ai->ai_next) {
smb_krb5 = talloc(NULL, struct smb_krb5_socket);
if (!smb_krb5) {
return ENOMEM;
}
smb_krb5->hi = hi;
switch (a->ai_family) {
case PF_INET:
name = "ipv4";
break;
#ifdef HAVE_SOCKET_IPV6
case PF_INET6:
name = "ipv6";
break;
#endif
default:
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
return EINVAL;
}
status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
switch (hi->proto) {
case KRB5_KRBHST_UDP:
if (lp_parm_bool(-1, "krb5", "udp", True)) {
status = socket_create(name, SOCKET_TYPE_DGRAM, &smb_krb5->sock, 0);
}
break;
case KRB5_KRBHST_TCP:
if (lp_parm_bool(-1, "krb5", "tcp", True)) {
status = socket_create(name, SOCKET_TYPE_STREAM, &smb_krb5->sock, 0);
}
break;
case KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP:
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
return EINVAL;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
continue;
}
talloc_steal(smb_krb5, smb_krb5->sock);
remote_addr = socket_address_from_sockaddr(smb_krb5, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen);
if (!remote_addr) {
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
continue;
}
status = socket_connect_ev(smb_krb5->sock, NULL, remote_addr, 0, ev);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
continue;
}
talloc_free(remote_addr);
smb_krb5->fde = event_add_fd(ev, smb_krb5,
socket_get_fd(smb_krb5->sock), 0,
smb_krb5_socket_handler, smb_krb5);
event_add_timed(ev, smb_krb5,
timeval_current_ofs(context->kdc_timeout, 0),
smb_krb5_request_timeout, smb_krb5);
EVENT_FD_WRITEABLE(smb_krb5->fde);
switch (hi->proto) {
case KRB5_KRBHST_UDP:
smb_krb5->request = send_blob;
break;
case KRB5_KRBHST_TCP:
smb_krb5->request = data_blob_talloc(smb_krb5, NULL, send_blob.length + 4);
RSIVAL(smb_krb5->request.data, 0, send_blob.length);
memcpy(smb_krb5->request.data+4, send_blob.data, send_blob.length);
break;
case KRB5_KRBHST_HTTP:
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
return EINVAL;
}
smb_krb5->timeout = False;
smb_krb5->status = NT_STATUS_OK;
smb_krb5->reply = data_blob(NULL, 0);
smb_krb5->partial = data_blob(NULL, 0);
while (!smb_krb5->timeout && (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(smb_krb5->status)) && !smb_krb5->reply.length) {
if (event_loop_once(ev) != 0) {
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
return EINVAL;
}
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(smb_krb5->status)) {
DEBUG(2,("Error reading smb_krb5 reply packet: %s\n", nt_errstr(smb_krb5->status)));
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
continue;
}
if (smb_krb5->timeout) {
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
continue;
}
ret = krb5_data_copy(recv_buf, smb_krb5->reply.data, smb_krb5->reply.length);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
return ret;
}
talloc_free(smb_krb5);
break;
}
if (a) {
return 0;
}
return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH;
}
krb5_error_code smb_krb5_init_context(void *parent_ctx,
struct smb_krb5_context **smb_krb5_context)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
struct event_context *ev;
initialize_krb5_error_table();
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(parent_ctx);
*smb_krb5_context = talloc(tmp_ctx, struct smb_krb5_context);
if (!*smb_krb5_context || !tmp_ctx) {
talloc_free(*smb_krb5_context);
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = krb5_init_context(&(*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("krb5_init_context failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
return ret;
}
talloc_set_destructor(*smb_krb5_context, smb_krb5_context_destroy_1);
if (lp_realm() && *lp_realm()) {
char *upper_realm = strupper_talloc(tmp_ctx, lp_realm());
if (!upper_realm) {
DEBUG(1,("gensec_krb5_start: could not uppercase realm: %s\n", lp_realm()));
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = krb5_set_default_realm((*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context, upper_realm);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("krb5_set_default_realm failed (%s)\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message((*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context, ret, tmp_ctx)));
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
}
/* TODO: Should we have a different name here? */
ret = krb5_initlog((*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context, "Samba", &(*smb_krb5_context)->logf);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("krb5_initlog failed (%s)\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message((*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context, ret, tmp_ctx)));
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
talloc_set_destructor(*smb_krb5_context, smb_krb5_context_destroy_2);
ret = krb5_addlog_func((*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context, (*smb_krb5_context)->logf, 0 /* min */, -1 /* max */,
smb_krb5_debug_wrapper, smb_krb5_debug_close, NULL);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("krb5_addlog_func failed (%s)\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message((*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context, ret, tmp_ctx)));
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
krb5_set_warn_dest((*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context, (*smb_krb5_context)->logf);
ev = event_context_find(*smb_krb5_context);
/* Set use of our socket lib */
ret = krb5_set_send_to_kdc_func((*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context,
smb_krb5_send_and_recv_func,
ev);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("krb5_set_send_recv_func failed (%s)\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message((*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context, ret, tmp_ctx)));
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
(*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context->mem_ctx = *smb_krb5_context;
talloc_steal(parent_ctx, *smb_krb5_context);
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
/* Set options in kerberos */
krb5_set_dns_canonicalize_hostname((*smb_krb5_context)->krb5_context, FALSE);
return 0;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
simple kerberos5 routines for active directory
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2005
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
struct smb_krb5_context {
struct krb5_context_data *krb5_context;
krb5_log_facility *logf;
};
krb5_error_code smb_krb5_init_context(void *parent_ctx,
struct smb_krb5_context **smb_krb5_context);
void smb_krb5_free_context(struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context);
krb5_error_code smb_krb5_send_and_recv_func(krb5_context context,
void *data,
krb5_krbhst_info *hi,
const krb5_data *send_buf,
krb5_data *recv_buf);